There were three major reasons behind the Japanese generals and admirals’ decision to attack the United States (US) naval fleet at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and declare war on the US, and each reason was entwined with one another.[1] The first and the most important reason was because Japan by late 1941 was suffering from economic shortages in natural resources such as oil due to the US, Japan largest supplier of natural resources, having imposed an oil embargo on Japan on 1 August 1941.[2] This was because of Japan’s expansion into East Asia and its invasion of Manchuria and French Indochina in 1931 and 1940 respectively, which was a part of their imperial aim to build a New Order in Greater East Asia.[3] Consequently, Japan’s generals and admirals’ in the climate of World War II (WWII) believed that Japan should attack the US naval fleet at Pearl Harbor in retaliation at the embargo, and because the US naval fleet threatened Japan’s expansionist aims in Southeast Asia, and its ability to gain control of oil fields in the Dutch East Indies. Secondly, the fact that Japan had emerged with a superior navy by 1941; achieved as a result of their naval race with the US, which had began in 1905, had led Japanese generals and admirals’ to decide once and for all to destroy the US pacific fleet, in order to gain total naval dominance in the Pacific.[4] Finally, Japan’s generals and admirals’ had decided to bomb Peal Harbor after being influenced by a variety of long and short-term factors over the timing of the attack, as Japan’s generals and admirals believed that it would be better to attack the US in the short term, in order to overcome US economic sanctions and use to their advantage their naval superiority.
This issue has stimulated a continuous debate among historians ever since the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the reasons surrounding the Japanese generals and admirals’ decision to bomb the US fleet at Pearl Harbor have been widely debated. Historians and the wider public have memorialized this event and it has become an important event of WWII, because from a Japanese perspective it was a major national triumph, while from an American perspective it was traumatic event that spurred the US into WWII and eventually led them to victory in commemoration of the American lives lost at Pearl Harbor. Most historians agreed that the US embargo, the Japanese naval superiority and short term factors over timing were the three main factors behind the Japanese generals and admirals' decision to attack the US naval fleet at Pearl Harbor, and that these factors were all interconnected with one another. Nevertheless, while these historians who wrote at different points in time agreed with these as major factors, they have also presented multiple interpretations and their remains a contentious debate over what was the most important reason behind the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Historians such as Slackman, Morely and Utley have argued like myself that the oil factor was the most important reason; Pelz, Prange and Marks on the other hand have focused their argument more on the naval race, while Toland and Fies have argued that short term factors over timing was the main factor.[5]
THE OIL FACTOR AND THE US OIL EMBARGO ON JAPAN IN 1941
The first and most important major reason behind the Japanese generals and admirals’ decision to attack Pearl Harbor was due to a US economic oil embargo, which had depleted Japan’s oil reserves that were vital to its war effort in China and Southeast Asia during WWII. Historically, Japan had very few raw materials of its own and thus has had to always rely heavily on foreign imports.[6] Most notably it relied on the US to obtain scrap iron, steel, oil, and other essential goods outside of Asia, and thus in Japanese terms it would be impossible to do without US trade.[7] Thus, the US strength was in the area of Japanese weakness, which was plentiful raw materials and oil.
The imposition of sanctions by the US were as a consequence of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and more importantly French Indochina in 1931 and 1940 respectively, and Japan’s desire for hegemony in East Asia.[8] Japan had invaded and expanded its empire into East Asia, according to Japan’s Prime Minister Kanoye, in order to rid Asia of Western domination and colonial rule based on their imperial concept of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity scheme, and also to become self-sufficient and free from economic dependence on the Western powers.[9] According to a Japanese Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941, the purpose of the invasion was to expel foreign influence from East Asia, to establish a sphere for the self-defence and self-preservation of our Empire, and to build a New Order in Greater East Asia.[10] Historians such as Slackman and Pelz have stated that by 1941 ‘Japan had acquired an empire of its own’ due to its invasions, but it also revealed how desperate Japan was to gain control of vital raw materials in East Asia, especially oil coal, rice, rubber, and iron, which were necessary for the maintenance of a technologically advanced military power during WWII.[11] Nevertheless, the US reacted to Japan’s expansionist push, as Japan had threatened the people of East Asia in countries such as China and broke the Kellogg-Briand treaty of 1928 of maintaining peace in the region.[12] Thus the US sought to quell their expansionist aims, as well as protect the people of East Asia from Japanese expansive aggression by imposing economic sanctions. These economic sanctions were made clear through Hoover-Stimson’s Non-Recognition Policy of Japan in 1931, which stated that economic sanctions might lead to war against Japan, but that they believed it to be necessary in order to stop Japan expanding across Asia.[13] The economic sanctions started, according to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, with a moral embargo in 1938 after the rape of Nanjing in 1937, then sanctions on aluminum in 1939, then sanctions on iron and scrap metal in 1940 and finally and most importantly an oil embargo came into force on 1 August 1941.[14] Thus, Japan’s invasions and policy of expansion brought about economic sanctions from the US.
Once the US trade embargo came into force, however, it devastated Japan’s economy, as Japan had lost its main reliable source of oil and other vital natural resources, and would give Japan only a few months before all the supplies would run out.[15] According to Statistical Abstract of the United States, US exports to Japan decreased from US$227,200,000 in 1940 to US$59,901,000 in 1941.[16] This led Prime Minster Tojo Hideki to state that: ‘the oil embargo had driven Japan into a corner’.[17] Historians have portrayed the US policy towards Japan during 1940-41 as gradually tightening the economic screws, especially on oil. Morley and Slackman have stated that in relation to the embargo, Japanese military and naval authorities calculated that Japanese industry and armed forces would grind to a halt within months if the flow were not restored, as ‘Japan depended almost entirely on oil imports, and the nation’s leadership viewed the embargo as tantamount to an act of war’.[18] Hence, the US oil embargo demoralized Japan’s economy and threatened their expansionist goals in East Asia.
The Japan generals and admirals were outraged by the US embargo and initially undertook diplomatic negotiations to restore trade links, but once these failed the Japanese retaliated against the US through their attack on Pearl Harbor. Initially, in November 1941 the Japanese sent an envoy led by diplomat Saburo Kurusu, Konoe Fumimaro and Admiral Kichisaburo to try and resolve the stand off between Japan and the US.[19] They put two proposal’s forward, Plan A and Plan B.[20] Plan A focused on China whereby the Japanese would slowly withdraw troops from China, in order to reestablish trade links.[21] While Plan B focused on Southeast Asia whereby Japan would withdraw troops from Indochina, in return for the US providing Japan with oil.[22] Although the US advisors to President Roosevelt such as Cordell Hull wanted to maintain peace in the Pacific, in the end the US refused Japan’s conditions and Plan A and Plan B, as the Japanese were never committed to fully withdraw from East Asia.[23] Consequently the Japanese generals and admirals decided to attack the US in retaliation at the US sanctions and because the US naval fleet at Pearl Harbor threatened Japan’s expansionist aims, and its ability to desperately gain much needed oil supplies in the Dutch East Indies unhindered.[24] According to Utley and Iriye, following the US embargo ‘Japan did not retreat but attacked Pearl Harbor and pushed toward the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies and Burma’.[25] Therefore, the US oil embargo played an important role in influencing Japan’s generals and admirals to attack the US naval fleet at Pearl Harbor, and showed that Japan and the US were on a collision course given Japanese ambitions and the US determination to prevent Japanese expansionism.
THE NAVAL RACE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE US
The fact that Japan navy had emerged superior by 1941 through their naval race with the US also influenced Japan’s generals and admirals to decide for once and for all to destroy the US Pacific fleet. This was so Japan could gain total naval dominance in the Pacific and subsequently give it the ability to expand its Empire without any interference in search for oil and other natural resources, and achieve its political objective of ridding East Asia of Western domination. Thus the Japan-US naval race was interrelated with the oil embargo. But before showing how Japan emerged with a superior navy it is important to understand that it was the history behind the naval race with the US, that led to Japan developing a more advanced navy by 1941. Historically, ever since Japan’s defeat of the Russian naval fleet in the Battle of Tsushima on 29 May 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the US had seen Japan as a naval competitor in the Pacific, which prompted a naval race between Japan and the US for naval superiority over the Pacific.[26] Both countries sought to be better than each other and both had a long-term strategy of destroying the other country’s naval fleets.[27] According to Pelz, ‘In 1934, the Japanese government demanded naval equality with…the United States’.[28] Historians Sadao and Seiichi have also stated that, ‘the only country considered to have the power to curb Japanese aggression was the United States’, and subsequently Japan underwent a rapid transformation, as it aggressively sought to build a superior navy, to give it the ability to expand into East Asia unimpeded.[29] Hence, the long running naval race between Japan and the US influenced Japan to build a more advanced navy, in order for it to gain naval dominance in the Pacific.
By 1941 the Japanese naval fleet had emerged as superior in their naval race with the US because the militaristic regime in Japan had undertaken an aggressive naval building scheme, and had increased military expenditure through its involvement in WWII and subsequent invasions of Manchuria and Southeast Asia in 1930s and early 1940s. According to Pelz and Roskill comparative naval figures, Japan fleet consisted of 232 ships compared to the US, which had 172 ships and only three aircraft carriers compared to Japan’s ten.[30] Japanese naval superiority was also reinforced by the fact that Japan’s navy had developed the torpedo bomb and went to great lengths to minimize the chance that the secret would fall into the hands of the enemy in the US.[31] The fact that the Japanese navy had emerged superior led the Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki to state that, ‘the American fleet standing by in Hawaii [was] equivalent to an American military threat aimed at Japan’, and thus Japan should take a chance and use its more advanced navy to destroy their Pacific fleet, even though there was always the possibility that Japan may be defeated.[32] Historians such as Prange and Marks have argued that the US Pacific Fleet was ‘so inferior to the Japanese navy in every category of fighting ship’, which consequently influenced the Japanese due to their naval superiority to destroy their only remaining foreseeable threat in the Pacific to their expansionist aims, which was the US.[33] While, Pelz has argued that Japan decided to strike ‘before the Americans tipped the naval balance back against the [Japanese] empire’.[34] Therefore, the fact that the Japanese navy had emerged more advanced by 1941 gave the Japanese generals and admirals’ the inspiration to decide to attack the US, as they knew the likelihood of success was great, and that success would allow Japan to be free to expand its empire unimpeded.
THE LONG AND SHORT TERM FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION TO ATTACK THE US
The final major reason behind Japan’s decision to attack the US fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was due to long and short term factors over the timing of the attack, as Japan’s generals and admirals’ believed that it would be better to attack the US in the short-term, in order to overcome US economic sanctions and due to their naval superiority. Initially, according to Prince Higashikuni, there was some initial tension between the navy and the army over the timing of the attack.[35] Nevertheless, the Japanese understood not only that if they waited too long to attack the US, the US maybe too powerful for such an attack to take place but also that they could not compete in a long war with the US as they had a large industrial base, which could provided constant supplies during a war effort.[36] Thus the Japanese generals and admirals such as, Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the mastermind of the Pearl Harbor attack, and the Emperor Hirohito at the Japanese Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941 stated that they believed that an immediate attack would be more likely to be a success, because ‘as time passes, our capacity to carry on war will decline, and our Empire will become powerless militarily’.[37] While according to admiral Nagano, ‘if we are going to fight [the US], then the sooner the better because our supplies [of fuel and oil] are fast running out’.[38] Thus in the short term it was better to attack the US quickly while they were still weak due to remaining isolated from the war. This was backed up by historian Pelz and Toland who argued that ‘Japan lacked the strength to compete with the Americans over the long term, [and that] its short-term prospects were much better’, before the naval balance had tipped against the empire.[39] Fies agreed as he argued that Japan ‘lacked the basic means for a long struggle’ and that ‘Japan had no chance to win a prolonged conflict with the US’.[40] Therefore, the Japanese generals and admirals were influenced by short term factors such as US economic sanctions and their naval superiority, and thus decided to launch an immediate attack, which also subsequently revealed that all these three factors were interconnected in the decision making process over whether Japan should attack the US.
Therefore, there were three interrelated reasons why the Japanese generals and admirals attacked Pearl Harbor, which were the US embargo, the Japanese naval superiority and short-term factors over timing. Most historians such as Morley, Pelz and Toland have agreed that these reasons were the main factors behind the Japanese generals and admirals’ decision to attack the US military forces in Pearl Harbor and declare war on the US.[41] Nevertheless, these historians have had multiple interpretations over what was their main argument in relation to this issue. Nonetheless, in hindsight we can see that Japan’s decision to attack the US, while producing a minor victory, was not well thought out, as it did not have the desired affect of allowing Japan to expand into East Asia without interference but led to a protracted Pacific War conflict with the US, which ended with the dropping of two atomic bombs by the US on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and Japanese defeat.
[1] There are many other reasons for the attack on Pearl Harbor, such as historical tensions, however for the purpose of this essay I will only analyze the three main reasons mentioned in the above introduction; ‘Japan Wars on US and Britain; makes sudden attack on Hawaii; Heavy fighting at Sea reported’, in New York Times, 8 December 1941, p 1.
[2] ‘US Aviation Fuel Barred to Japan as Roosevelt Order Curbs Exports; Silk to be banned for Civilian Use’, in New York Times, 2 August 1941, p 1.
[3] Marius Jansen. ‘The Manchurian Incident, 1931’, in Japan Erupts: The London naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932, edited by in James William Morley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 121; Peter Berton. ‘Introduction’, in The Fateful Choice: Japan’s advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941, edited by James William Morley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, p 5.
[4] Roberta Wohlstetter. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, p 111.
[5] There are other historians who have argued differently by stating that not only were these three factors important but also other factors such as historical tensions between Japan and the US over the US opening up Japan in 1854 and placing more emphasis on Japan’s expansionist policy were also important. Nevertheless for the purpose of this essay I will only concentrate on the arguments of the historians mentioned in the above historical paragraph; Michael Slackman. Target: Pearl Harbor. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990, p 3; James Morley (ed.). The Final confrontation: Japan’s negotiations with the United States, 1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p xv; Jonathan Utley. ‘Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41’, in Prologue, (Spring 1976), p 17; Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, p 9; Gordon Prange. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986, p xv; Frederick Marks. ‘Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The Diplomatic Dress Rehearsal’, in Pearl Harbor Revisited, edited by Robert Love. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995, p 39; John Toland. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1982, p 256; Herbert Fies. The Road To Pearl Harbor: The coming of the War Between the United States and Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, p 5.
[6] Raymond Vernon. Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the quest for Oil and Ores. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, p 82; James Herzog. ‘Influence of the United States Navy in the Embargo of Oil to Japan, 1940-1941’, in Pacific historical Review, (August 1966), p 318; Joyce Lebra (ed.). Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents. London: Oxford University Press 1975, p xiii.
[7] Akira Iriye. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. London: Longman Press, 1987, p 79.
[8] James Crowley. Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, p xiv and xviii; Marius Jansen. ‘The Manchurian Incident, 1931’, p 121; Peter Berton. ‘Introduction’, p 5; Seishiro Sugihara. Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam. Lanham: University Press of America, 1997, p 23; ‘US Aviation Fuel Barred to Japan as Roosevelt Order Curbs Exports; Silk to be banned for Civilian Use’, p 1.
[9] Nobutaka Ike. Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 policy conferences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p xix; Joyce Lebra (ed.). Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents, p xiii; ‘24th Liaison Conference – May 15, 1941’, in Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 policy conferences, edited by Nobutaka Ike. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p 35; ‘Imperial Conference – July 2, 1941’, in Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 policy conferences, edited by Nobutaka Ike. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p 78.
[10] ‘Imperial Conference – September 6, 1941’, in Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 policy conferences, edited by Nobutaka Ike. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p 152; Joyce Lebra (ed.). Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents, p xiii.
[11] Michael Slackman. Target: Pearl Harbor, p 3; Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 215.
[12] Norman Graebner. ‘Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese’, in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p 25; Clarke Kawakami. ‘Lid on iron exports said to blow to Japan’, in The Japan Times, 12 December 1940, p 1; Herbert Fies. The Road To Pearl Harbor: The coming of the War Between the United States and Japan, p 49; Akira Iriye. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, p 87; Guangqiu Xu. ‘The Issue of Air Assistance to China in the US-Japanese Relations, 1931-1941’, in Asian Profile, (February 1999), p 11.
[13] Errol Clauss. ‘The Roosevelt Administration and Manchukuo, 1933-1941’, in The Historian, (August 1970), p 595; ‘23rd Liaison Conference – May 13, 1941’, in Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 policy conferences, edited by Nobutaka Ike. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p 33; Norman Graebner. ‘Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese’, p 27.
[14] Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1934, 1938 and 1943; Mira Wilkins. ‘The Role of US Business’, in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p 373; ‘US Aviation Fuel Barred to Japan as Roosevelt Order Curbs Exports; Silk to be banned for Civilian Use’, p 1.
[15] Michael Slackman. Target: Pearl Harbor, p 5; Hiroyuki Agawa. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. Tokyo: Kodansha international, 1983, p 226; James Morley (ed.). The Final confrontation: Japan’s negotiations with the United States, 1941, p xv.
[16] Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1934, p 428; 1938, p 464; 1943, p 538; Mira Wilkins. ‘The Role of US Business’, p 371.
[17] Peter Wetzler. Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998, p 56.
[18] Michael Slackman. Target: Pearl Harbor, p 5; Hiroyuki Agawa. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, p 226; James Morley (ed.). The Final confrontation: Japan’s negotiations with the United States, 1941, p xv.
[19] ‘Japan’s parley’s with US hit snag; no meeting held’, in New York Times, 22 November 1941, p 1; Akira Iriye. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, p 159.
[20] ‘Plan A and Plan B. November 7 and November 20, 1941’, in Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A brief History with Documents and Essays, edited by Akira Iriye. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999, p 38-40.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Cordell Hull. ‘Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the US and Japan’, in Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A brief History with Documents and Essays, edited by Akira Iriye. New York: St Matin’s Press, 1999, p 74-77.
[24] The Dutch East Indies is now known as Indonesia; Cordell Hull. ‘Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the US and Japan’, p 74-77. Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 215; ‘Imperial Conference – September 6, 1941’, p 148.
[25] Jonathan Utley. ‘Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41’, p 17; Akira Iriye. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, p 151.
[26] Roberta Wohlstetter. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, p 111.
[27] Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 53 and 67.
[28] Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 9.
[29] Imai Seiichi. ‘Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen’, in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p 70; Asada Sadao. ‘The Japanese Navy and the United States’, in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p 225.
[30] Gordon Prange. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, p xv; Thomas Mahnken. ‘Gazing at the Sun: the Office of Naval Intelligence and Japanese Naval Innovation, 1918-1941’, in Intelligence and national Security, July (1996), p 436.
[31] Stephen Roskill. The War at Sea. London: Her Majesty’s Stationer’s office, 1954-1960, p 560-561; Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 221.
[32] Robert Butow. Tojo and the coming of War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, p 190.
[33] Gordon Prange. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, p 109; Frederick Marks. ‘Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The Diplomatic Dress Rehearsal’, p 39; Hearings before the joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, Part 39, Washington DC, 1946, p 266.
[34] Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 212.
[35] Prince Higashikuni. ‘Kido’s No War policy is Scrapped’, in The Final confrontation: Japan’s negotiations with the United States 1941, edited by James William Morley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p 233.
[36] Ibid.
[37] ‘Imperial Conference – September 6, 1941’, p 154; James Rusbridger and Eric Nave. Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II. New York: Summit Books, 1991, p 101 & 102; Peter Wetzler. Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan, p 2 & 33; Stephen Large. Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A political biography. London: Routledge, 1992, p 111 and 115.
[38] Alan Schom. The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War 1941-1943. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004, p 113; Herbert Bix. Hirohito and the Making of Japan. New York: HarperCollins, 2000, p 406-407.
[39] Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 217 and 226; John Tolland. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath, p 256.
[40] Herbert Fies. The Road To Pearl Harbor: The coming of the War Between the United States and Japan, p 5.
[41] James Morley (ed.). The Final confrontation: Japan’s negotiations with the United States, 1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p xv; Stephen Pelz. Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, p 9; John Toland. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath, p 256.
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